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ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF THE CRIME CHARGED
FOR BEING A PERSON OF CRIMINAL CHARACTER.
Testimony of the May 18 incident of domestic violence,
of speculative assertions that the defendant attempted to
burglarize the family home, that he engaged in domestic
violence and assaultive behavior for which there was
insufficient evidence for prosecution, and that he
"kidnaped" his wife on a previous occasions, proved not that
the defendant kidnaped his wife in the instant case, but
that the defendant was a person of criminal character and he
must have kidnaped his wife.
The State claims that the testimony of the May 18
assault was relevant to refute allegations that Ms. Palmer
had fabricated the story, that Ms. Palmer was "so afraid
that she and her children stayed with her parents7' only
"visiting the family home at certain" times. Br. Aple. at
21.

The fact that Ms. Palmer chose different times to be

at the home supports Mr. Holbert's claim that his wife
invited him to the home because Mr. Holbert had no way to
know, absent information from Ms. Palmer, when the family
would be there.

That possibility was naturally lost on the
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jury given all the inadmissible evidence it heard, including
evidence of an attempted break-in at the family home for
which the defendant was presumed to be the perpetrator
despite a lack of evidence connecting him with the alleged
attempted break-in; allegations of domestic violence and
protective order violations not prosecuted for lack of
evidence; references that the defendant had held the
defendant "hostage" before; and testimony that the defendant
had a prior conviction for assault.
The jury's only picture of the defendant was what
appeared to be his hostility and controlling behavior, an
illusion painted by the prosecutor through his use of claims
of prior bad acts which were not prosecuted for lack of
evidence, the victims characterization of a prior
"kidnaping" incident, and evidence of the defendant's prior
misdemeanor assault conviction.

The admission of that

evidence set the stage for the jury to do just what Dean
Wigmore described in his treatise on the admissibility of
specific bad acts testimony, to give "excessive weight to
the vicious record of crime" and allowed it to bear "too
strongly on the present charge...irrespective of the
accused's guilt of the present charge."
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See, State

vs.

Doporto,

935 P.2d, 484, 488 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted).

The fact remains that evidence of May 18 incident, in
addition to the evidence of the prior break-in attempt at
the family home, allegations of two prior domestic violence
and protective order violations not prosecuted for lack of
evidence, and the introduction of the defendant's prior
misdemeanor conviction, was unfairly prejudicial,
inflammatory, and it distorted the deliberative process. The
process was distorted because the jury had no choice but to
convict for kidnaping this man because it had before it
speculative assertions that he had attempted to burglarize
the family home, and although no charges were filed,
assertions that he had kidnaped his ex-wife before and had
engaged in numerous acts of domestic violence and assaultive
behavior before, finally, that he was convicted for
assaulting Ms. Palmer before. Mr. Holbert was convicted of
kidnaping as a result of his presumed bad character and his
prior bad acts.
If the improper evidence had not been considered by the
jury, there is a reasonable likelihood that it would have
returned a different verdict, therefore, the admission of
the evidence was not harmless.
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EVIDENCE OF THE MAY ASSAULT DOES NOT
MEET REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSIBILITY
UNDER RULE 403.
The State claims testimony that the defendant had
previously assaulted his wife was relevant to establish his
motive and intent, and to show a specific pattern of
behavior toward her.

In deciding whether evidence of other

crimes is admissible, the trial court must determine (1)
whether the evidence is being offered for a proper,
noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence
meets the requirement of rule 402, and (3) whether the
evidence meets the requirements of rule 403.

State

Decorso,

528 U.S. 1164

1999 UT 59, 993 P.2d 837, cert

denied

v.

(2000) .
Assume for the sake of discussion that the challenged
evidence was offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose,
and, as the State contends, it is admissible to prove motive
to commit the offense charged.

Its admissibility must still

fail because it does not meet the third part of the analysis
for admissibility.

Under Rule 403, other crimes evidence

does not meet rule 403's requirements if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.
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Decorso,

1999 UT 57 525.

In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of evidence, the
court must consider
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes,
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of the
alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence
probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.
Id. at 529.
Ms. Palmer testified that Mr. Holbert held her "hostage"
for "an hour and a half", however, Mr. Holbert was never
charged with kidnaping in that incident.

The court also

permitted testimony of two prior investigations into
allegations of protective order violations and domestic
violence which did not produce sufficient evidence to pursue
prosecution. Likewise, testimony was admitted that law
enforcement investigated an attempted burglary at the
couple's residence and that they considered the defendant to
be a suspect in that incident.

Neither the prior allegations

of protective order violations and domestic violence, and the
attempted burglary at the marital home produced sufficient
evidence to warrant prosecution. If several investigations by
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law enforcement cannot produce sufficient evidence to pursue
prosecution, the evidence as to the commission of the crimes
must be considered weak and as a result, should not be
permitted at trial.
Finally, the challenged evidence obviously has a high
degree of probability for rousing the jury to overmastering
hostility.

The jury heard evidence that the defendant

assaulted Ms. Palmer on numerous occasions, that he held her
"hostage", and that he did so in the presence of his
children.

Those acts do rouse overmastering hostility.

Domestic violence is so reviled in our society that violation
of a protective order can be a felony offense.
The danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs
the probative value of evidence because the evidence of the
commission of the other crimes was so weak that they could
not be prosecuted, there was no need for the evidence, and
the evidence likely roused the jury to overmastering
hostility.

Therefore, the evidence was not admissible under

rule 403 and does not meet the admissibility test under
404(b).

Page 6 of 9

ONE PRIOR CONVICTION FOR SIMPLE ASSAULT
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A "PATTERN OF ABUSE"
The State contends prior bad acts are admissible to show
a "pattern of abuse" between the defendant and his wife.
However, as argued above, the evidence of prior protective
order violations and domestic violence, and an attempted
burglary at the couple's home, was insufficient to warrant
prosecution.

It goes without saying, therefore, that it is

insufficient to constitute proof that a "pattern of abuse"
exited between the defendant and his wife.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in the Appellant's
Brief, the Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction for
Aggravated Kidnaping and asks the court to remand for a new
trial because he was deprived of his constitutionally
protected right of a fair trial and his right to effective
assistance of counsel.
DATED this

1^?

day of V^TlAg)

, 2002
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NO ADDENDUM IS NECESSARY
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